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Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in
the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a
dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies
that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores
on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with
“mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by
increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices
of less reflective individuals (i.e., those who rely more heavily on intuition), on the other
hand, are more likely to be associated with either egalitarian or spiteful motives. We also
identify a negative link between reflection and choices characterized by “strong” altruism,
but this result holds only in Study 2. Moreover, we provide evidence that the relationship
between social preferences and CRT scores is not driven by general intelligence. We
discuss how our results can reconcile some previous conflicting findings on the cognitive
basis of social behavior.
Keywords: dual-process, intuition, social preferences, altruism, spitefulness, prosocial behavior, antisocial
behavior, inequality aversion

INTRODUCTION
Mounting evidence shows that humans cooperate with non-kin even when doing so implies paying
irrecoverable costs (Ledyard, 1995; Gintis, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 2002;
Bowles and Gintis, 2003; Camerer, 2003). These prosocial behaviors are inconsistent with the strict
pursue of self-interest and thus constitute a challenge for disciplines ranging from evolutionary
biology to the social and behavioral sciences (Nowak, 2006; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Harbaugh
et al., 2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2008; Roca et al., 2009; Capraro, 2013; Exadaktylos et al., 2013; Rand
and Nowak, 2013; Gutiérrez-Roig et al., 2014; Raihani, 2014).
In recent years, the cognitive underpinnings of social behavior have been increasingly
studied, as their understanding is key for building a comprehensive account of the
proximate—and, indirectly, also ultimate—explanations of human sociality (Stevens and
Hauser, 2004; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Zaki and Mitchell, 2013). Much of the advances
on this front have been made within the framework of dual-process theories, which point
to the existence of an interaction between fast, automatic/intuitive (“System 1”) and slow,
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also shows that people often make “antisocial” decisions that
reduce others’ welfare without any apparent personal gain (Zizzo
and Oswald, 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Knoch et al., 2006;
Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008; Abbink et al.,
2010; Espín et al., 2012; Kimbrough and Reiss, 2012; BrañasGarza et al., 2014). Spiteful behaviors that harm others even at
one’s own cost may yet be advantageous, for example, in social
environments where survival hinges upon one’s relative standing
in the group1 . Therefore, following the SHH argument, some
people might internalize behaviors that not only promote but
also reduce others’ welfare as an adaptation to their daily life
interactions. Welfare-reducing behaviors are likely to respond to
antisocial motives that aim at increasing one’s relative standing
(Kirchsteiger, 1994; Van Lange, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Jensen, 2012). This logic has been applied, for instance, to
understanding the punishment decisions of non-cooperators in
social dilemma games (Shinada et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2005;
Gächter and Herrmann, 2011; Espín et al., 2012). When the
punishing individual is a cooperator, however, fairness-based
explanations are often put forward (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Espín
et al., 2012). From this viewpoint, fairness concerns, which
are traditionally considered to be prosocial (Van Lange, 1999),
can also lead to behaviors that reduce the payoff of another
individual.
To analyze the cognitive underpinnings of human social
interaction, we believe it is important to distinguish people’s
actual behaviors and motivations. To do so, it is necessary to
bring back the too-often ignored antisocial motivations at the
center of the debate. Our research thus aims at studying a broad
range of prosocial as well as antisocial motives and assess to
which extent these motives are driven by either intuition or
reflection.

controlled/reflective (“System 2”) decision making processes
(Hogarth, 2001; Stanovich, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). From
this perspective, most research has focused on answering the
question of whether human prosocial (as opposed to selfish)
behavior is the result of intuition or reflection (Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, 2004; Moore and Loewenstein, 2004; Rand et al.,
2012; Zaki and Mitchell, 2013). In other words, are humans’
automatic responses selfish or prosocial?
An extensive research program on the topic has identified
cooperation as the intuitive response in anonymous one-shot
social dilemma experiments, with further reflection leading to
more selfish choices (Rand et al., 2012, 2014, 2015; Cone and
Rand, 2014; Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2014; Evans et al., 2015).
These findings have led to the Social Heuristics Hypothesis
(SHH; Rand et al., 2014), according to which people internalize
social behaviors that generate personal benefits in daily life. In
contrast to most economic experiments, daily life interactions are
often repeated and face-to-face, and this implies that behaving
cooperatively may be rewarding in the long run (through
reciprocity, reputation or due to the existence of sanctions;
Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1966; Trivers, 1971; Fudenberg and
Maskin, 1986; Bowles and Gintis, 2003). Individuals interacting
in environments where helping others usually pays off would thus
be more likely to internalize prosocial behaviors than individuals
dwelling more “inhospitable” environments (Rand et al., 2012;
Peysakhovich and Rand, 2015). Such internalization would lead
people to apply prosocial heuristics even in situations where
cooperation is maladaptive, such as in one-shot anonymous
economic experiments.
Even though the SHH has received considerable empirical
support (Roch et al., 2000; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Rand
et al., 2012, 2014, 2015; Lotito et al., 2013; Cone and Rand,
2014; Nielsen et al., 2014; Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2014; Schulz
et al., 2014; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2015; Evans et al.,
2015), a number of findings seem inconsistent with the idea
of spontaneous prosociality and calculated selfishness (e.g.,
Knoch et al., 2006, 2010; Dewall et al., 2008; Piovesan and
Wengström, 2009; Martinsson et al., 2012, 2014; Xu et al.,
2012; Tinghög et al., 2013; Crockett et al., 2014; Jaber-López
et al., 2014; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014). In this paper,
we shall argue that our understanding of the sources of these
apparent contradictions may benefit from an in-depth analysis
of the motivations underlying social behavior. A distinction
should thus be made between observed behavioral outcomes and
underlying social motivations (Falk et al., 2005; Jensen, 2010;
Espín et al., 2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 2014). Indeed, a variety
of “prosocial” motivations (e.g., altruism or egalitarianism; see
below) can trigger seemingly identical prosocial behaviors. It
might be the case that some of the prosocial motivations that
account for a specific behavior are linked to intuition whereas
others are linked to reflection. This may explain why the
analysis of isolated social decisions has led to mixed findings
regarding the role of intuitive and reflective processes in prosocial
behavior.
The previous discussion focused on the often-studied
prosocial side of human behavior but it nonetheless extends to the
less-studied antisocial side. Evidence from economic experiments
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Disentangling Social Motives
To assess the motivations behind social decisions, we consider an
“outcome-based”—or distributional—social preferences model,
namely the inequality-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), which introduces the payoffs of relevant others into
the individuals’ utility function. Individuals with outcome-based
social preferences behave as if they were maximizing a utility
function which includes a concern for the payoff of others, in
addition to their own payoff. In particular, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) account for a potential asymmetry between advantageous
and disadvantageous payoff comparisons between the self and
a referent other (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 1989). We extend the
previous model so as to capture behaviors that may not strictly
follow from standard inequality-aversion preferences. We will
rely on a generalized and flexible specification of preferences
that will allow us to disentangle competing explanations of
individuals’ decisions, including both prosocial and antisocial
motivations. Similar approaches have been followed for instance
1 This may be the case, e.g., when there exist high levels of environmental
uncertainty/volatility (e.g., violence) or when local (vs. global) competition for
resources prevails (Gardner and West, 2004; McCullough et al., 2012; Sylwester
et al., 2013; Prediger et al., 2014).
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reflective decisions. CRT scores have been found to predict
one’s own ability to refrain from using inaccurate heuristics
in a variety of situations (Oechssler et al., 2009; Toplak et al.,
2011)3 . Furthermore, there is evidence that the same behaviors
that are observed after experimental manipulations of intuitive
processing covary with CRT scores in the expected direction
(e.g., Shenhav et al., 2012). With regards to social behavior,
Peysakhovich and Rand (2015) show that an individual’s score
on the CRT can predict her tendency to apply previouslyacquired social heuristics in environments where they are
not advantageous. The authors first conducted repeated social
dilemmas where cooperation was or was not advantageous before
embedding subjects in one-shot games (social dilemma, dictator,
and trust games) where prosocial behavior was detrimental
to subjects’ payoff. As predicted by the SHH, subjects who
had interacted in the environment where cooperation was
advantageous were on average more prosocial in the subsequent
one-shot games compared to those who had interacted in the
environment where cooperation was disadvantageous. However,
after separating subjects according to cognitive style, the authors
show that the predicted spillover effect was only observed among
subjects with low CRT scores.
Our empirical strategy will be to correlate subjects’ answers
to the extended version of the CRT (Toplak et al., 2014)
with their decisions in the social preferences elicitation task. A
similar approach has been undertaken in an independent study
conducted by Cueva et al. (in press) and Ponti and RodriguezLara (2015). We present the results of two studies one of which
was conducted in the US and the other in Spain.

by Charness and Rabin (2002); Engelmann and Strobel (2004);
Engelmann (2012) and Cox (2013)2 .
As mentioned, one caveat in the categorization of social
behavior is that individuals’ decisions in standard economic
games are typically consistent with different types of motivations.
For instance, both spiteful and selfish motives would identically
lead to zero transfers in dictator games (Brañas-Garza et al.,
2014) or to defection in social dilemma games (Falk et al.,
2005; Espín et al., 2012). Similarly, the acceptance of a low
offer in the ultimatum game could result from either selfishness
or altruism (Staffiero et al., 2013). In order to uncover the
driving forces behind a particular decision, a clear cut procedure
is to observe the decisions made by the same individual in
different social situations (Falk et al., 2005; Espín et al., 2012;
Yamagishi et al., 2012; Staffiero et al., 2013; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2014; Peysakhovich et al., 2014). In addition, these decisions
should be free of strategic or reciprocal concerns since these
could alter behavior and distort the assessment of outcomebased preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002). Building on
this argument, our experimental design makes use of several
decisions in short, cognitively undemanding and non-strategic
tasks.

A trait Approach to Cognitive Reflection
To isolate intuitive and reflective cognitive processes, previous
behavioral research on social behavior has primarily relied on the
analysis of reaction times (e.g., Rubinstein, 2007; Piovesan and
Wengström, 2009; Brañas-Garza et al., 2012b; Rand et al., 2012;
Lotito et al., 2013) and the use of experimental manipulations,
such as cognitive load (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2011; Duffy and
Smith, 2014; Hauge et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2014) or time
pressure (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Cone and Rand, 2014; Rand
et al., 2014, 2015; Rand and Kraft-Todd, 2014). In this paper,
we adopt a trait approach which relies on the assumption that
individuals who have a more intuitive cognitive style are more
likely to make decisions guided by automatic processes (System
1), whereas more reflective individuals are more likely driven by
deliberative processes (System 2) (Oechssler et al., 2009; Toplak
et al., 2011; Peysakhovich and Rand, 2015). Subjects’ cognitive
styles are assessed through the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005), which measures the ability to override intuitive
responses and to engage in further reflection before making a
decision. The CRT is a short task consisting of a set of insights
problems (three in the original form of Frederick, 2005; and
seven in the extended version introduced by Toplak et al., 2014).
The CRT differs from other measures of cognitive abilities as it
is designed to prompt an intuitive, yet incorrect, answer to the
respondent’s mind. To reach the correct answer, the person must
override this automatic response by engaging in reflection.
The CRT fits in nicely with the dual-process approach
of decision making. The responses to the test are indeed a
good proxy for the individuals’ tendency to make intuitive vs.

STUDY 1
Methods
Participants and General Protocol
Participants were 150 students [44.67% female; mean age 20.61
± 2.73 (SD)] from Chapman University in the U.S. Participants
were enrolled in the following majors at the time of the
study: Business and Economics (28.7%), Humanities and Social
Sciences (21.3%), Science and Technology (15.3%), Film Studies
(16.7%), Performing Arts (4.0%), Health and Behavioral Sciences
(4.0%), Law School (2.7%), Educational Studies (2.0%) or other
studies (5.3%). These participants were recruited from a database
of more than 2000 students. A subset of the whole database
received invitations at random for participating in the current
study, which is part of a larger research program on cognitive
abilities and economic decision making. The local IRB approved
this research. All participants provided informed consent prior to
participating. No deception was used.
3 Also, the CRT has been found to correlate with one’s ability to delay gratification
(Frederick, 2005; Bosch-Domènech et al., 2014) and avoid distractions at work
(Corgnet et al., in press). In addition, student performance in the CRT has
been shown to correlate positively with earnings in experimental asset markets
(Corgnet et al., 2015) and other individual tasks involving the capacity to think
backwards (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012a). Finally, the CRT has also been shown to
correlate negatively with the adoption of paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al.,
2012; Shenhav et al., 2012).

2 Note

that we are using preference types as a classification device, irrespective
of whether or not these are completely stable characteristics of individuals
as often assumed in the social preferences literature. Indeed a number of
studies challenge such interpretation and suggest that social preferences can be
modulated/manipulated (e.g., Rand et al., 2012; McCall et al., 2014).
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We conducted a total of 12 sessions, nine of which with
12 participants and three of which with 14 participants. On
average, sessions lasted for 45 min. All subjects completed the
same tasks in the same order given that we would need a
much larger sample size in order to statistically control for the
effect of all possible task sequences. The order and nature of
the tasks are shown in (Supplementary) Text S1. Importantly,
since our aim is to study reflection as a cognitive disposition
(i.e., the trait approach), the social preferences elicitation task
was performed before the CRT. Otherwise, having completed
the CRT could have induced a reflective mindset which might
alter the relationship between trait reflectiveness and the behavior
under study (Paxton et al., 2012). In any case, in between
the social preferences elicitation task and the CRT participants
completed a series of unrelated tasks for about 15 min and had a
break of 10 min to reduce the potential influence of exhaustion
or cognitive load. This protocol also alleviates concerns about the
existence of between-tasks spillover effects (e.g., Fromell et al.,
2014) which may potentially induce reverse causality. However,
none of these two factors can be completely ruled out with
our procedure and concerns about the influence of uncontrolled
variables remain.

TABLE 1 | Decisions in the social preferences task (Study 1).
Decision #

Option B
self, other

1

$2,$2

(β ≥ 0) [86%]

$2,$1

(β ≤ 0) [14%]

2

$2,$2

(β ≥ 0.5) [23%]

$3,$1

(β ≤ 0.5) [77%]

3

$2,$2

(α ≥ 0) [42%]

$2,$4

(α ≤ 0) [58%]

4

$2,$2

(α ≥ 0.5) [31%]

$3,$5

(α ≤ 0.5) [69%]

For each option, we display the payoff for the decision-maker and the recipient, the
associated model parameters (in parentheses) and the % of subjects choosing it (in square
brackets). N = 150.

our sample, ranging from 8 to 18, mean = 14.61 ± 2.12) is a
conventional measure of cognitive ability. This test captures an
important aspect of cognitive ability which is referred to as fluid
intelligence or algorithmic thinking (Stanovich, 2009, 2010).
Consistently with Frederick (2005) and Stanovich (2009, 2010)
we find moderate positive correlation between the number of
correct answers in the CRT and Raven tests (r = 0.43, p < 0.01)
which suggests that CRT and Raven are not entirely measuring
the same cognitive skills. As is standard practice, none of the
cognitive tests were incentivized (Frederick, 2005).

Social Preferences Elicitation

Cognitive Style Assessment

We elicited social preferences à la Bartling et al. (2009)
by asking participants to make four choices between two
possible allocations of money between themselves and another
anonymous participant with whom they were randomly
matched. All participants made all the four decisions. We
used this short task because it provides a good balance
between (maximizing) the information that can be obtained and
(minimizing) the cognitive effort required to complete the task.
In each experimental session, two participants and one of the
four decisions were selected at random for payment. The choice
of the first participant in the selected decision was used to allocate
payoffs between the two participants (e.g., Sheremeta and Shields,
2013). All decisions were anonymous.
The allocation decisions are described in Table 1. Option A
always yielded an even distribution of money ($2 for both the
self and the other participant), whereas option B yielded uneven
payoffs. The first two decisions refer to the advantageous domain
while the last two decisions refer to the disadvantageous domain.
For each decision, we show in parentheses the envy/compassion
parameter associated to choosing the egalitarian and nonegalitarian options (i.e., options A and B) and in square brackets
the proportion of subjects who chose each option. In order to
compute the model parameters, we assume that utility is linear
over the range of payoffs involved in the task (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). According to the basic specification of the model (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) for the two-person case, the utility derived
by individual i from the payoff vector X =(xi , xj ) is given by:


Ui (X) = xi − αi max xj − xi , 0 − βi max xi − xj , 0
(1)

We measured the participants’ tendency to rely on intuition
vs. reflection using the Cognitive Reflection Test introduced by
Frederick (2005). To the original CRT questions, we added four
questions recently developed by Toplak et al. (2014). The full
set of questions can be found in (Supplementary) Text S2. In
Table S1, we display the % of subjects answering each question
correctly, split by gender. As expected, males performed better
in the test than females (Frederick, 2005; Bosch-Domènech et al.,
2014) and this difference was statistically significant (see Table
S1). Our measure of cognitive reflection is given by the total
number of correct answers (from 0 to 7). The full distribution
of correct answers by males (mean = 3.67 ± 2.25) and females
(mean = 2.39 ± 1.95) is provided in Figure S1.
In addition to CRT, we also measured general intelligence
which is likely to be a confounding factor of the (potential)
relationship between CRT scores and social behavior. Because
answering CRT questions require cognitive abilities, CRT scores
partly capture general intelligence in addition to cognitive
reflection (Frederick, 2005; Stanovich, 2009). However, cognitive
reflection differs from intelligence as measured in standard
IQ tests (e.g., Raven matrices). Intelligence tests measure one’s
capacity to compute solutions to problems but fail to assess one’s
capacity to engage in reflection (Stanovich, 2009). Although basic
cognitive abilities are required to answer the CRT correctly, an
intelligent person may often rely on automatic answers (System
1) falling short of blocking intuitive processes by engaging in
reflection (System 2). In order to evaluate the importance of
general intelligence as a possible confound in the relationship
between CRT and social behavior, we measured subjects’ IQ using
the Raven progressive matrices test (Raven, 1941) and used it as
a control variable in our analyses. Specifically, we used the odd
number of the last three series of matrices (Jaeggi et al., 2010).
The number of matrices correctly solved in the Raven test (in
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org

Option A
self, other

where the parameters αi and βi refer to the individual i’s
aversion to disadvantageous (i.e., “envy”) and advantageous
inequality (i.e., “compassion”), respectively. Thus, a selfregarding individual who is indifferent to others’ payoffs would
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hand, Decisions 3 and 4 resemble the decision of a second player
(responder) in the standard ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982)—
if we leave reciprocal concerns aside—who has to choose whether
to reject (option A) or accept (option B) a disadvantageous split
proposed by the first player (proposer).

exhibit αi = βi = 0. A person with other-regarding motives
would prefer either to increase or decrease others’ payoffs
depending on the sign and value of αi [βi ] if others’ payoffs are
above [below] her own payoffs.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume αi ≥ βi ≥ 0, which means
that individuals can be either egalitarian (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0; with
at least one inequality being strict) or selfish (αi = βi = 0). This
parameterization also implies that people are assumed to display
at least as envy as compassion (αi ≥ βi ). We do not impose
these restrictions on the model parameters so that individuals’
motivations can be characterized as follows:

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Decision Analysis
In Table 2, we report the results of Probit models estimating the
likelihood of choosing option B (i.e., the non-egalitarian choice)
in each of the four decisions as a function of CRT scores, Raven
scores and gender. Note that a Bonferroni-like correction for
multiple comparisons is not appropriate in this case because the
decisions are substantially correlated as they all help measure
social preferences (through estimates of different intervals for the
(α, β) parameters) (see Table S3). To alleviate concerns about
multiple comparisons, we present a multivariate Probit analysis
in Table S5 and show that the results are remarkably similar.
Models in columns (1a)–(4a) of Table 2 estimate the
likelihood of choosing option B as a function of CRT scores,
and controlling for gender. Columns (1b)–(4b) replicate the same
regressions but using Raven scores, instead of CRT, as the main
explanatory variable. Finally, in columns (1c)–(4c) both CRT
and Raven are included as regressors. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level are presented in parentheses and
marginal effects are presented in square brackets. In Figure 1 we
display the % of subjects choosing option B in each decision,
broken down into two CRT groups, namely individuals with
below-median (i.e., three or less correct answers, n = 86) and
above-median (n = 64) scores.
From column (1a) of Table 2, we observe that the CRT score is
negatively and significantly associated with the choice of option
B in Decision 1 (p = 0.04), suggesting that more reflective
subjects are less likely to reduce the counterpart’s payoff below
their own payoff. In terms of the model parameters, subjects
with higher CRTs are less likely to exhibit β ≤ 0. A two-sided
binomial test rejects the hypothesis that above-median CRTs
are indifferent between the two options in Decision 1 (i.e., 50%
probability of choosing option B, p < 0.01), as would be the
case for an individual motivated by self-interest (i.e., β = 0).
For below-median CRTs, the binomial test yields a similar result
(p < 0.01). Therefore, regardless of CRT, most subjects seem to
exhibit strictly positive compassion (β > 0) (see Figure 1). The
marginal effect of CRT scores on Decision 1 is −0.029 (Table 2,
column 1a), which means that the dependent variable changes by
2.9% for each 1-point increase in CRT scores. Since CRT ranges
between 0 and 7, the difference between CRT = 0 and CRT =
7 in terms of the dependent variable is about 20%. As can be
seen in Table 1, the mean proportion of non-egalitarian choice in
Decision 1 is 14%, so that the predicted probability of choosing
the non-egalitarian option in Decision 1, on average and roughly
speaking (as it depends also on gender), goes from 24% for CRT
= 0 to 4% for CRT = 7.
However, in Decision 2, where increasing the other’s payoff
is costly, CRT is no longer significant (p = 0.30, column 2a).

(i) Self-interest if individuals’ decisions maximize their own
payoff (αi = 0 and βi = 0);
(ii) Altruism if individuals’ decisions maximize the other’s payoff
(αi ≤ 0 and βi ≥ 0; with at least one inequality
being strict)—a concern for social welfare also applies if, in
addition, |αi |, |βi |< 0.5 (Engelmann, 2012)4 —;
(iii) Egalitarianism if individuals’ decisions minimize payoff
inequality (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0; with at least one inequality
being strict);
(iv) Spitefulness if individuals’ decisions minimize the other’s
payoff (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≤ 0; with at least one inequality
being strict)—which, for empirically relevant values of αi and
βi , also implies a preference for increasing the individual’s
relative standing;
(v) Inequality-seeking if individuals’ decisions maximize payoff
inequality (αi ≤ 0 and βi ≤ 0; with at least one inequality
being strict)—note that we include this type of preferences
for the sake of completeness even though few individuals
typically fall into this category.
Hence, we classify individuals’ motives according to the
combination of both model parameters. Following previous
literature, we shall consider that altruism and egalitarianism are
prosocial preferences (e.g., Van Lange, 1999; Fehr and Schmidt,
2006) while spitefulness is antisocial (e.g., Herrmann and Orzen,
2008; Jensen, 2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 2014).
As it happens with nearly every single decision in social
interactions, each choice is consistent with multiple social
preferences. For instance, in Decision 1 the participants had
to decide whether or not to increase the payoff of a worse-off
counterpart by $1 at no cost—or, alternatively, whether or not
to reduce the other’s payoff below one’s own by $1 at no cost.
Choosing option A in Decision 1 implies β ≥ 0 (compassion)
and thus it may, depending on the exact value of β and the
sign of α, be consistent with either egalitarianism, altruism,
social-welfare concerns or self-interest (a selfish individual would
choose randomly in this decision). Option B in Decision 1 is
associated with β ≤ 0, which means that it can be chosen by
individuals driven by either spitefulness or self-interest. Note
that Decision 2 resembles the standard dictator game (Forsythe
et al., 1994) in the sense that increasing the other’s payoff does
not increase the total surplus, i.e., social welfare. On the other
4 Note that an individual with α

≤ −0.5 and β ≥ 0.5 would give money away even
when doing so does not increase the total surplus (i.e., social welfare, also referred
to as “efficiency”).
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TABLE 2 | Non-egalitarian choice (option B) as a function of CRT and
Raven (Study 1).

CRT

Female

Cons

ll

Decision 2

Decision 3

Decision 4

β ≤ 0 (vs ≥ 0) β ≤ 0.5 (vs ≥ 0.5) α ≤ 0 (vs ≥ 0) α ≤ 0.5 (vs ≥ 0.5)

(1a)

(2a)

(3a)

(4a)

−0.136**

−0.054

0.249***

0.236***

(0.065)

(0.054)

(0.055)

(0.059)

[−0.029**]

[−0.016]

[0.083***]

[0.073***]

−0.573*

−0.329

−0.205

−0.219

(0.306)

(0.236)

(0.224)

(0.233)

[−0.120**]

[−0.098]

[−0.069]

[−0.068]

−0.465*

1.077***

−0.438*

−0.070

(0.278)

(0.252)

(0.230)

(0.233)

[0.321]

[0.859]

[0.331]

[0.472]

−57.017

−79.185

−88.038

−81.547

Wald χ2

5.27*

2.43

23.72***

19.25***

Pseudo R2

0.061

0.014

0.137

0.126

(1b)

(2b)

(3b)

(4b)
0.121**

Raven

Female

Cons

ll

−0.061

0.034

0.093*

(0.052)

(0.055)

(0.050)

(0.050)

[−0.013]

[0.010]

[0.035*]

[0.040**]

−0.438

−0.242

−0.468**

−0.446**

(0.273)

(0.228)

(0.211)

(0.219)

[−0.095]

[−0.072]

[−0.175*]

[−0.149**]

−0.024

0.373

−0.945

−1.051

(0.852)

(0.811)

(0.745)

(0.742)

[0.490]

[0.645]

[0.172]

[0.147]

−58.909

−79.473

−97.676

−88.273

Wald χ2

3.25

1.45

8.33**

9.50***

Pseudo R2

0.030

0.010

0.043

0.054

(1c)

(2c)

(3c)

(4c)

−0.134*

−0.090

0.253***

0.221***

(0.075)

(0.057)

(0.061)

(0.064)

[−0.028*]

[−0.026]

[0.084***]

[0.068***]

−0.007

0.074

−0.009

0.036

(0.070)

(0.059)

(0.055)

(0.055)

[−0.001]

[0.022]

[−0.003]

[0.011]

−0.571*

−0.361

−0.202

−0.233

CRT

Raven

Female

Cons

ll

(0.309)

(0.234)

(0.226)

(0.236)

[−0.120*]

[−0.106]

[−0.067]

[−0.072]

−0.376

0.131

−0.319

−0.540

(0.936)

(0.817)

(0.734)

(0.749)

[0.353]

[0.552]

[0.375]

[0.304]

−57.012

−78.420

−88.026

−81.365

Wald χ2

5.41

4.57

23.72***

19.30***

Pseudo R2

0.061

0.023

0.137

0.128

150

150

150

150

N

% of subjects

Decision 1
Dep var:

below-median CRT

Decision 1
(β ≤ 0)

Decision 2
(β ≤ 0.5)

above-median CRT

Decision 3
(α ≤ 0)

Decision 4
(α ≤ 0.5)

FIGURE 1 | Percentage of subjects choosing option B in each decision,
by CRT groups (Study 1). The model parameters associated to option B are
shown in parentheses.

This result suggests that the probability that the compassion
parameter exceeds 0.5 does not differ across CRT scores.
Additionally, within both the above-median and below-median
CRT groups, a two-sided binomial test rejects that subjects are
indifferent between the two options (ps < 0.01). This suggests
that, regardless of CRT, β 6= 0.5. Indeed, for both above- and
below-median CRTs, the % of subjects choosing option B is
strictly above 50%, suggesting a median β strictly below 0.5 (see
Figure 1).
Taken together, the results of Decision 1 and 2 indicate that,
whereas the majority of subjects exhibit βǫ(0, 0.5), subjects with
lower CRT scores are yet significantly more likely to exhibit
β ≤ 0.
With respect to disadvantageous comparisons, column (3a)
shows that CRT positively and significantly predicts choosing
option B in Decision 3 (p < 0.01), which indicates that more
reflective individuals are more likely to exhibit α ≤ 0. From
Figure 1, we observe that this effect is strong, as nearly 80%
of the subjects with above-median CRT decide not to lower
their counterpart’s payoff (this is significantly different from 50%:
two-sided binomial test, p < 0.01), while only about 42% of
below-median CRTs do so (which is not significantly different
from 50%, p = 0.16). These results suggest that high-CRT
individuals are not indifferent between both options in Decision
3—as would be the case for an individual motivated by selfinterest, i.e., α = 0. In sum, high-CRT individuals are mostly
characterized by α < 0, while the envy parameter that best
characterizes low-CRT individuals seems to be close to zero or
even slightly positive.
The results for Decision 4 are similar to those for Decision 3
as option B is positively and significantly predicted by CRT (p <
0.01, column 4a). This suggests that more reflective individuals
are also more likely to exhibit α ≤ 0.5. Observing that more
than 80% of the above-median CRT subjects choose option B in
Decision 4 (see Figure 1; this proportion is significantly different
from 50%: two-sided binomial test, p < 0.01), we can conclude
that the envy parameter that best describes high CRTs is strictly
lower than 0.5. In the case of below-median CRTs, however,
this percentage falls to 58% (which is not significantly different
from 50%, p = 0.16). Following the results of Decisions 3 and
4, low-CRT subjects, on average, display values of α which are
apparently higher than those of high-CRT subjects.

Probit estimates. The α and β parameters associated with the dependent variable are
displayed on top of each column. In “a” regressions, the main explanatory variable is CRT
score. In “b” regressions, the main explanatory variable is Raven score. In “c” regressions,
both CRT and Raven scores are included as explanatory variables. Robust standard
errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses and average marginal effects
of the explanatory variables are shown in square brackets (for the constant, this value
represents the probability obtained from normal transformation of the Probit coefficient).
*, *, *** denote p-values lower than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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a complete picture of the motives driving social behavior. Our
next analyses address this point.
Figure 2 displays the % of individuals who are classified
according to all possible combinations of the α and β parameters.
Note that we include only those subjects with consistent choices,
that is, choices which lead to compatible estimates of both α
and β. This procedure excludes only one subject (out of 150).
The left and right panels refer to subjects with below- and
above-median CRT scores. In the table below each 3D plot,
we highlight which among the combinations of the α and β
parameters are consistent with each of the six categories of social
motives previously defined: altruism, social-welfare concerns,
self-interest, egalitarianism, spitefulness and inequality-seeking.
For instance, all the (α, β) categories that include the value
of 0 for both parameters are consistent with self-interest. The
four cells representing these categories are surrounded by a
green line. Also, the two (α, β) categories that include negative
values of α and positive values of β are consistent with altruistic
motives and are surrounded by a light blue line. As was suggested
by the previous analyses, above-median CRTs are concentrated
(55% of them) in the category “α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5],” which is
highlighted in Figure 2. The proportion of above-median CRT
subjects belonging to this category is significantly larger than the
proportion of above-median CRT subjects belonging to any other
category (two-sided Normal Proportion tests, ps < 0.01). In the
case of below-median CRT subjects a much lower proportion
(29%) belong to the “α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5]” category (two-sided
Normal Proportion test, p < 0.01). This category is still the
most populated category among below-median CRT individuals
and the proportion of individuals belonging to this category is
significantly larger than the proportion of below-median CRT
individuals belonging to any other category (two-sided Normal
Proportion tests, ps < 0.01) but the “α ≥ 0.5, β ǫ [0, 0.5]”
category (p = 0.38).
The category “α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5]” is consistent with both selfinterest and altruism and can thus be seen as “weak altruism”.
Our choice of terminology is to refer as “weak” all the social
preferences categories that are consistent with self-interest (i.e.,
α = 0 and β = 0). We refer to as “strong” all the (α, β) social
preferences categories which are not “weak.” Note that the “weak
altruism” category is also the only category that is consistent
with social-welfare motives. In order to show that these subjects
display a preference for social welfare, however, one must show
that −0.5 < α < 0 which cannot be demonstrated given the
social preferences elicitation task used in this study.
In order to inquire further on the categorization of social
preferences and highlight differences across CRT scores, we
perform a multinomial Probit regression (see Figure 3). We
estimate the likelihood that an individual is included in the
category “α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5]” as compared to each of the other
eight categories. We include CRT scores and gender as regressors.
In each cell representing an (α, β) category in Figure 3, we show
the coefficient associated to CRT scores for the comparison of
this specific (α, β) category with the omitted category (“α ≤ 0,
β ǫ [0, 0.5]”). As expected, all the coefficients associated to CRT
are negative, indicating that subjects with higher CRT scores are
more likely to be included in the default category than in any of

Note that the qualitative nature of our statistical results
does not depend on whether we use CRT scores or a
binary categorization of CRT (as in Figure 1). Using abovemedian (vs. below-median) CRT as a binary explanatory
variable in the regression analysis instead of CRT scores
yields similar results (see Table S7). The effect of CRT in
Decision 1 is, however, no longer significant at standard
levels (p = 0.21).
Now, we turn to the second set of regressions of Table 2
(columns 1b–4b), where subjects’ choices are estimated as a
function of Raven scores. For those decisions for which CRT
was found to be a significant predictor (namely Decisions 1,
3, and 4), the effect of Raven is qualitatively similar to that
of CRT, although it seems to be less important (even nonsignificant in the case of Decision 1, p = 0.28). These
results may indicate that a non-negligible share of the observed
relationship between CRT and social preferences is actually
driven by general intelligence. In order to address this point,
we conducted a last series of regressions in which the scores on
both cognitive measures are included as explanatory variables
(columns 1c–4c). The regression results point to the opposite
direction: the effect of CRT remains statistically significant
while the significance of Raven scores completely vanishes when
both variables are included in the same model. Note that
this effect cannot be attributed to collinearity issues. A quick
comparison of the regressions displayed in panel (a) and (c)
shows that the standard error of the coefficient associated to the
Raven variable increases only very slightly. More formally, using
standard collinearity diagnostic analysis for all the regressors
used in panel (c) regressions we report variance inflation factors
for CRT, Raven and gender of 1.24, 1.14, and 1.09 which
indicates the absence of collinearity problems5 . Thus, CRT
is a more important determinant of social preferences than
Raven. Note that the coefficient associated to Raven scores
is reduced by more than 70% after controlling for CRT in
the three aforementioned decisions. Given that CRT accounts
for virtually all the effect of Raven on social decisions, we
can conclude that general intelligence is not confounding the
relationship between CRT and social preferences. For our
subsequent analysis we will thus focus on the analysis of
CRT scores.

Social Preferences Categorization
According to the above results, the decisions of most high-CRT
individuals can be characterized as non-envious, i.e., α < 0,
and moderately compassionate, i.e., β ǫ (0, 0.5). Although
the majority of low-CRT individuals seem to be moderately
compassionate as well they differ from high-CRT individuals
by being envious. In addition, individuals with lower CRT
scores are also significantly more likely to exhibit a non-positive
compassion parameter (β ≤ 0), which in combination with envy
(α > 0) would be a sign of antisocial, spiteful motivations. As
previously argued, combining both α and β is essential to obtain
5 Variance inflation factors above 10 are typically associated with collinearity issues

(e.g., Neter et al., 1989; Kennedy, 2008; Hair et al., 2009). The lowest threshold
for the variance inflation factor we are aware of is 4 (see O’Brien, 2007). Even this
lower threshold would not be met in our case.
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FIGURE 2 | Classification of subjects according to the envy and compassion parameters, by CRT groups (Study 1). The figure displays the % of subjects
that can be classified according to each combination of α and β and the social preferences which are consistent with each category, broken down into below-median
(n = 85) and above-median (n = 64) CRT score groups.

egalitarian motives. Yet, our previous analysis of each of the four
decisions in the social preferences elicitation task led to the more
precise conclusion that high CRTs are characterized by α < 0
and β ǫ (0, 0.5). That is, high-CRT individuals are unlikely to be
purely selfish (α = 0, β = 0); instead they can be considered as
mildly altruistic.
Given the data of Study 1, high-CRT people are apparently
more willing to give money to the other person than low-CRT
people as long as it is not too costly for them to do so. Indeed,
subjects with higher CRT scores are more willing to give money
to the other person when it is costless (Decisions 1, 3, and 4) but
not when it is very costly (Decision 2). Moreover, note that those
subjects who give money to the other person in Decisions 1, 3,
and 4 may respond to concerns for social welfare whereas such
interpretation of giving is not valid for Decision 2.
However, substantial differences may still exist in the levels of
envy (α) and compassion (β) among those subjects characterized
as mildly altruistic. Some mildly altruistic individuals may be
close to selfishness (α ≈ 0, β ≈ 0) whereas others may not.
Our data cannot separate these different types of subjects. To
that end, we extend the social preferences elicitation task of

the other categories. These coefficients are significant (ps < 0.01)
when comparing the default category with the following ones:
“α ǫ [0, 0.5], β ≤ 0” (weakly spiteful), “α ǫ [0, 0.5], β ǫ [0, 0.5]”
(weakly egalitarian) and “α ≥ 0.5, β ≤ 0” (strongly spiteful). The
coefficients are close to significance when comparing the default
option with the category “α ≥ 0.5, β ≥ 0.5” (strongly egalitarian,
p = 0.06). However, CRT scores are not statistically significant
when comparing the default category with the remaining three
categories (ps > 0.41): “α ≤ 0, β ≥ 0.5” (strongly altruistic),
“α ≤ 0, β ≤ 0” (weakly inequality seeking) and “α ǫ [0, 0.5],
β ≥ 0.5” (strongly egalitarian). Yet, the latter two categories
contain only six and four observations, respectively. Finally, only
the coefficients of these three categories (−0.030, −0.011, and
−0.117, respectively) are significantly (or close to significance)
different from that of the strongly spiteful category “α ≥ 0.5,
β ≤ 0” (p < 0.01, p < 0.01, and p = 0.06), which reports the
highest coefficient in absolute value (−0.457).
Our classification thus suggests that high cognitive reflection
is characteristic of individuals with α ≤ 0 and β ǫ [0, 0.5],
which corresponds to “weak” altruism, whereas less reflective
individuals are more likely to be guided by either spiteful or
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α≤0

0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5

self-interest
inequality-seeking

β≤0

spitefulness

-0.298***
(0.111)
[n=5]

-0.457***
(0.137)
[n=10]

category
[n=60]

-0.297***
(0.071)
[n=8]

-0.288***
(0.095)
[n=26]

-0.030
(0.084)
[n=20]

-0.117
(0.144)
[n=4]

-0.217*
(0.117)
[n=10]

-0.011
(0.102)
[n=6]

Participants were enrolled in the following majors at the time
of the study: Business and Economics (51.9%), Law School
(28.5%), Humanities and Social Sciences (5.7%), Science and
Technology (11.4%), and other studies (2.5%). These participants
were recruited from a database of more than 2500 students.
We conducted a total of eight sessions, three with 18 and 20
participants each and two with 22 participants. On average,
sessions lasted for 60 min. As in Study 1, all subjects completed
the same tasks in the same order and the social preferences
elicitation task was performed before the CRT. In between the
social preferences task and the CRT, participants completed a
series of unrelated tasks for about 15 min and had a break of
10 min (see Text S1). All participants in the experiments reported
in this Study agreed to the Participation Rules and Privacy Policy
when they registered to participate in experiments. Anonymity
was always preserved (in agreement with Spanish Law 15/1999
on Personal Data Protection) by randomly assigning a numerical
code to identify the participants in the system. No association
was ever made between their real names and the results. As is
standard in socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are
involved other than preserving the anonymity of participants. No
deception was used. This procedure was checked and approved
by the department of Economics of the University Carlos III of
Madrid; the institution hosting the experiments. At that time no
official IRB was established at the university.

α ≥ 0.5

β ≥ 0.5

0 ≤ β ≤ 0.5

social-welfare

altruism

egalitarianism

FIGURE 3 | Output of multinomial Probit regression (Study 1). In each
cell, the figure shows the coefficient of CRT obtained by comparing that
specific social preference category with “α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5]”. *, **, *** denote
p-values lower than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Ll = −247.017, Wald
χ2 = 45.12 (p < 0.01), N = 149. Robust standard errors clustered on
individuals are shown in parentheses, and the number of observations in
square brackets.

Cognitive Style Assessment
As in Study 1, participants completed the extended version of the
CRT developed by Toplak et al. (2014). In Table S2, we display the
% of subjects answering each question correctly, split by gender.
Again, males scored higher on the test than females and these
differences were statistically significant (see Table S2). The full
distribution of correct answers by males (mean = 3.22 ± 1.73)
and females (mean = 2.18 ± 1.35) is provided in Figure S2. The
test was not incentivized.

Bartling et al. (2009) in our second study. First, we include in
our elicitation task a decision for which increasing the payoff
of the other person above one’s own is personally costly. This
decision will allow us to isolate subjects who are practically
selfish (α ≈ 0) in the negative domain of envy. Second,
among mildly altruistic subjects there may be individuals with
social-welfare concerns (|αi |, |βi |< 0.5). To isolate people who
care about social welfare, we need that increasing the betteroff counterpart’s payoff in the aforementioned decision also
increases social welfare (i.e., the cost for the decision maker is
lower than the increase in the other player’s payoff). In addition,
we need to include another decision for which increasing a worseoff counterpart’s payoff at a personal cost also increases social
welfare.
In order to dig into these issues and obtain a more refined
assessment of the values of α and β, we thus modified the social
preferences task of Bartling et al. (2009) by adding two decisions
which were designed along the lines of the previous discussion.
This modified task was implemented in Study 2.

Social Preferences Elicitation
Participants made six choices between two possible allocations of
money between themselves and another anonymous participant
with whom they were randomly matched. Similarly to Study 1,
in each experimental session, two participants and one of the six
decisions were selected at random for payment. The choice of
one of the two participants in the selected decision was used to
allocate payoffs between the two participants. All decisions were
anonymous. The first four decisions used the exact same payoffs
as in Bartling et al. (2009). Decisions 5 (advantageous domain)
and 6 (disadvantageous domain) were designed for this particular
experiment in such a way that the decision maker could increase
the payoff of the other participant by e6 at a e2 cost. Thus, the
cost for the decision-maker is low relative to the increase of the
other’s payoff (i.e., a 1:3 cost-to-benefit ratio) so that giving also
increases social welfare. The new task allows us to disentangle
four subcategories of the “weak altruism” category of Study 1
(α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5]) which was the most populated category
and also the only one which was consistent with welfare concerns.
In Study 2 and in contrast to Study 1, we could identify subjects
exhibiting combinations of α and β that are consistent with

STUDY 2
Methods
Participants and General Protocol
Participants were 158 students [51.90% female; mean age 21.52
± 2.63 (SD)] from the University Carlos III of Madrid in Spain.
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of option B in each decision is regressed as a function of CRT
scores, controlling for gender. Robust standard errors clustered
on individuals are presented in parentheses, and marginal effects
in square brackets. As in Study 1, the results are fairly similar if we
account for (correlated) multiple comparisons using multivariate
Probit (see Tables S4, S6). In Figure 4, we display the proportion
of subjects choosing option B in each decision, for individuals
with below-median (i.e., two or less correct answers, n = 85) and
above-median (n = 73) CRT scores.
We find that CRT is negatively related to choosing option B
in Decision 1, indicating that individuals with higher CRT scores
are less likely to display β ≤ 0, in line with the findings in Study 1.
Although this relationship is only close to significance (p = 0.09),
it is worth noticing that the marginal effect of CRT is 3.1% and the
mean proportion of non-egalitarian choice in Decision 1 is 14%,
which results in a strong size effect remarkably similar to that
obtained in Study 1 (i.e., 2.9%). Moreover, the effect of cognitive
reflection on Decision 1 is statistically significant (p = 0.04,
Table S8, column 1) when the binary categorization is used as
explanatory variable. As in Study 1, a two-sided binomial test
rejects the hypothesis that individuals are indifferent between the
two options (for both below- and above-median CRT scores, the
proportion of subjects choosing option B is well below 50%; ps
< 0.01; see Figure 4). That is, the majority of subjects, especially
those with higher CRT scores, seem to display β > 0.
In Decision 2, we observe some discrepancy with respect
to Study 1 where the effect of CRT was negative although not
significant. In Study 2, CRT scores are positively related to
choosing option B, indicating that higher CRT individuals are
more likely to exhibit β ≤ 0.5. Yet, this relationship is only close
to significance (p = 0.09) and even turns insignificant when the
binary categorization of CRT is used (p = 0.32, Table S8, column
2). As in Study 1, the proportion of subjects choosing option B in
Decision 2 is higher than 50% in both CRT groups (two-sided
binomial tests, ps < 0.01; see Figure 4). That is, the majority
of subjects, especially those with higher CRT scores, seem to be
characterized by β < 0.5.
With regards to Decisions 3 and 4, the results are similar
to those of Study 1. Specifically, CRT is positively associated
with the choice of option B in Decision 3, implying α ≤ 0.
Although this relationship falls short of significance in Table 4
(p = 0.07), it turns significant when the binary CRT variable is
used (p = 0.03, Table S8, column 3). From Figure 4, we see that
roughly 48% of below-median CRT subjects choose option B in
Decision 3 (which is not significantly different from 50%, twosided binomial test, p = 0.66, so we cannot reject that they are,
on average, indifferent between both options: α = 0). In contrast,
68% of above-median CRT subjects choose option B (which
is significantly different from 50%, p < 0.01). So, high-CRT
subjects seem to display α < 0. In Decision 4, the choice of option
B is positively and significantly predicted by CRT (p = 0.04; the
binary CRT categorization yields p = 0.05, Table S8, column 4),
implying that higher CRT subjects are more likely to display α ≤
0.125. Indeed, about 79% of above-median CRT subjects choose
option B in Decision 4 (Figure 4), which is significantly different
from 50% (two-sided binomial test, p < 0.01), whereas 61% of
below-median CRT subjects did so (which is also significantly

social-welfare concerns but not with self-interest. We could thus
distinguish between “weak” and “strong” preferences for social
welfare.
In particular, the 1:3 cost-to-benefit ratio used in Decision
5 allows us to break down the β ǫ [0, 0.5] category into
two subcategories ([0, 0.25] and [0.25, 0.5]) thus refining our
estimation of individual social preferences. Note that the payoffs
used in Study 1 had to be increased in order to break down
the β ǫ [0, 0.5] category while also avoiding negative or noninteger payoffs. To accomplish this, we decided to use the
original payoffs of Bartling et al. (2009). Given that utility is
assumed to be linear over the relevant range of payoffs (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999), it is important to point out that it is not
the absolute but the relative change in payoffs which determines
the values of the model parameters in each case. For the sake
of symmetry, we used the same 1:3 cost-to-benefit ratio for
Decision 6 so that we could estimate values of α below as
well as above −0.25. All the allocation decisions are described
in Table 3. Option A always yielded an even distribution of
money (e10 to both the self and the other participant) whereas
option B yielded uneven payoffs. For each decision, we show
in parentheses the envy/compassion parameter associated to
choosing the egalitarian and non-egalitarian options (i.e., options
A and B) and in square brackets the proportion of subjects who
chose each option. Note that the model parameters associated
to Decisions 1–4 are the same as in Study 1, except for the fact
that in Decision 4 the threshold for the envy parameter is now
0.125 instead of 0.5. However, given that the categorization of
social preference types does not depend on the exact value of
α (provided that it is positive), whether 0.125 or 0.5 is used as
threshold should not interfere with the goal of our study.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Decision Analysis
Decisions 1–4 as reported in Table 3 mimic very closely the
results of Study 1 (see Table 1) suggesting that our original
results are remarkably robust to eliciting social preferences in a
different country with a different set of payoffs. Table 4 reports
the results of a series of Probit regressions where the choice

TABLE 3 | Decisions in the social preferences task (Study 2).
Decision # Option A self

Option B self

other

other

1

e10,e10

(β ≥ 0) [86%]

e10,e6

(β ≤ 0) [14%]

2

e10,e10

(β ≥ 0.5) [27%]

e16,e4

(β ≤ 0.5) [73%]

3

e10,e10

(α ≥ 0) [42%]

e10,e18

(α ≤ 0) [58%]

4

e10,e10

(α ≥ 0.125) [30%] e11,e19

(α ≤ 0.125) [70%]

5

e10,e10

(β ≥ 0.25) [42%]

(β ≤ 0.25) [58%]

6

e10,e10

(α ≥ −0.25) [84%] e8,e16

e12,e4

(α ≤ −0.25) [16%]

For each option, we display the payoff for the decision-maker and the recipient, the
associated model parameters (in parentheses) and the % of subjects choosing it (in square
brackets). N = 158.
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TABLE 4 | Non-egalitarian choice (option B) as a function of CRT (Study 2).

Dep var:

CRT

Female

Cons

ll

Decision 1

Decision 2

Decision 3

Decision 4

Decision 5

β≤0

β ≤ 0.5

α≤0

α ≤ 0.125

β ≤ 0.25

Decision 6
α ≤ −0.25

(vs ≥ 0)

(vs ≥ 0.5)

(vs ≥ 0)

(vs ≥ 0.125)

(vs ≥ 0.25)

(vs ≥ −0.25)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)
−0.044

−0.149*

0.122*

0.124*

0.150**

0.109

(0.088)

(0.073)

(0.069)

(0.072)

(0.067)

(0.084)

[−0.031*]

[0.040*]

[0.047*]

[0.049**]

[0.042*]

[−0.011]
−0.146

0.306

0.070

−0.285

−0.462**

0.294

(0.276)

(0.227)

(0.213)

(0.223)

(0.216)

(0.257)

[0.063]

[0.023]

[−0.108]

[−0.151**]

[0.113]

[−0.035]

−0.898***

0.252

0.017

0.390

−0.250

−0.812***

(0.334)

(0.271)

(0.262)

(0.264)

(0.260)

(0.315)

[0.184]

[0.599]

[0.507]

[0.652]

[0.401]

[0.208]
−68.750

−60.929

−90.969

−103.938

−90.902

−105.927

Wald χ2

6.18**

2.89

6.86**

10.74***

3.35

0.44

Pseudo R2

0.045

0.017

0.035

0.063

0.016

0.004

158

158

158

158

158

158

N

Probit estimates. The α and β parameters associated with the dependent variable are displayed on top of each column. Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are shown
in parentheses and average marginal effects of the explanatory variables are shown in square brackets (for the constant, this value represents the probability obtained from normal
transformation of the Probit coefficient). *, **, *** denote p-values lower than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.

below-median CRT

100

above-median CRT

90
80
% of subjects

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Decision 1
(β ≤ 0)

Decision 2
(β ≤ 0.5)

Decision 3
(α ≤ 0)

Decision 4
(α ≤ 0.125)

Decision 5
(β ≤ 0.25)

Decision 6
(α ≤ -0.25)

FIGURE 4 | Percentage of subjects choosing option B in each decision, by CRT groups (Study 2). The model parameters associated to option B are shown
in parentheses.

are significantly different from 50%, two-sided binomial tests,
ps < 0.01; see Figure 4), which implies that the majority of
subjects is best characterized by α > −0.25, regardless of CRT
scores.
In sum, the previous analysis suggests that high-CRT
individuals are best described by α ǫ (−0.25, 0) and β ǫ (0, 0.25),
whereas the distribution of the envy and compassion parameters
of low CRT subjects is much more disperse.

different from 50%, p = 0.05). Thus, α < 0.125 seems to best
characterize the majority of subjects, especially those with high
CRT scores.
In Decision 5, CRT does not yield a significant effect (p = 0.11;
using the binary CRT variable, p = 0.39, Table S8, column 5).
While 60% of above-median CRT subjects choose option B in
Decision 5 (this proportion is close to be significantly different
from 50%, two-sided binomial test, p = 0.10), this percentage
shrinks to 55% for below-median CRT subjects (not significantly
different from 50%, p = 0.38) (Figure 4). This indicates that most
high-CRT subjects are characterized by β < 0.25, whereas the
median β seems to be close to 0.25 for low-CRT subjects. Finally,
in Decision 6, where option B implies α ≤ −0.25, the coefficient
associated to CRT is far from significant (p = 0.60; also using
the binary CRT variable, p = 0.74, Table S8, column 6). About
16% of below-median CRT subjects and 15% of above-median
CRT subjects choose option B in Decision 6 (both proportions
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Social Preferences Categorization
Now, we proceed by categorizing each individual according
to their social preferences. In Figure 5, we display the
proportion of subjects that are characterized by each of the
16 combinations of the envy and compassion parameters.
We represent below-median CRT subjects on the left panel
and above-median CRT subjects on the right panel. In our
social preferences categorization, we excluded 22 subjects whose
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FIGURE 5 | Classification of subjects according to the envy and compassion parameters, by CRT groups (Study 2). The figure displays the % of subjects
that can be classified according to each combination of α and β and the social preferences which are consistent with each category, broken down into below-median
(n = 68) and above-median (n = 68) CRT score groups.

social-welfare concerns, Study 2 allows us to identify different
degrees of such concerns. The category defining the majority of
above-median CRT subjects (“α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ǫ [0, 0.25]”)
corresponds to “weak” social-welfare concerns.
In order to further explore these observations, we conducted a
multinomial Probit regression, the results of which are presented
in Figure 6. As for Study 1, CRT and gender are used as
regressors. The most populated category, “α ǫ [−0.25, 0],
β ǫ [0, 0.25],” is used as the default category for the regression
analysis. The numbers inside the remaining cells indicate the
effect of CRT score on the likelihood that an individual is
included in this specific category as compared to the default
category. As expected, all estimates are negative indicating that
subjects with higher CRT scores are more likely to belong to
the default category “α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ǫ [0, 0.25]” than to the
remaining categories. The effect of CRT is statistically significant
when comparing the default category to the following ones:
“α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ≥ 0.5” (strongly altruistic, p = 0.02),
“α ǫ [0, 0.125], β ≥ 0” (weakly spiteful, p < 0.01), “α ≥ 0.125,
β ǫ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly egalitarian, p < 0.01) and “α ≥ 0.125,
β ≥ 0.5” (strongly egalitarian, p < 0.01). The effect of CRT

choices were inconsistent, so we ended up with 136 observations
(68 below-median and 68 above-median CRT subjects). No
individuals were assigned to the following categories: “α ≤
−0.25, β ≤ 0” (strongly inequality seeking), “α ≤ −0.25,
β ǫ [0, 0.25]” (strongly altruistic with social-welfare concerns)
and “α ǫ [0, 0.125], β ǫ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly egalitarian).
As expected, above-median CRT subjects are concentrated
(35% of them) in the category “α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ǫ [0, 0.25],”
which again represents “weak altruism,” whereas below-median
CRT subjects are more dispersed across categories, similarly
to Study 1. The proportion of above-median CRT subjects
belonging to this category is significantly larger than the
proportion of above-median CRT subjects belonging to any other
category (two-sided Normal Proportion test, ps < 0.01). In the
case of below-median CRT subjects a much lower proportion of
people (15%) belong to the “α ≤ 0, β ǫ [0, 0.5]” category (p <
0.01). This category is still the most populated category among
below-median CRT subjects but the proportion of below-median
CRT subjects belonging to this category is only significantly larger
than six out of the fifteen other categories. Note that, in contrast
to Study 1 where there was only one category consistent with
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α ≤ -0.25

0 ≤ α ≤ 0.125

-0.25 ≤ α ≤ 0

α ≥ 0.125

self-interest

-0.445***
(0.118)
[n=5]

-0.349*
(0.196)
[n=6]

[n=0]

category
[n=34]

-0.101
(0.136)
[n=15]

-0.225*
(0.129)
[n=15]

-0.220
(0.147)
[n=8]

-0.159
(0.133)
[n=14]

[n=0]

-0.490***
(0.171)
[n=7]

-0.335**
(0.152)
[n=10]

-0.024
(0.194)
[n=3]

-0.325***
(0.116)
[n=8]

β≤0

[n=0]

-0.041
(0.137)
[n=2]

0 ≤ β ≤ 0.25

spitefulness

0.25 ≤ β ≤ 0.5

inequality-seeking

β ≥ 0.5

social-welfare
-0.127
(0.154)
[n=9]

altruism

egalitarianism

FIGURE 6 | Output of multinomial Probit regression (Study 2). In each cell, the figure shows the coefficient of CRT obtained by comparing that specific social
preference category with “α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ǫ [0, 0.25]”. *, **, *** p-values lower than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Ll = −300.325, Wald χ2 = 50.17 (p < 0.01),
N = 136. Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses, and the number of observations in square brackets.

from the coefficients of the following categories: “α ≤ −0.25,
β ≥ 0.5” (strongly altruistic) and “α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ǫ [0.25, 0.5]”
(strongly altruistic with social-welfare concerns), although these
differences are only close to significance (ps = 0.08).
Taken together, the results of Study 2 indicate that high
cognitive reflection is characteristic of individuals who make
choices consistent with mildly altruistic motives that increase
social welfare at a very low cost. Low cognitive reflection
is characteristic of individuals who make decisions consistent
with either egalitarian or spiteful motives. These findings are
consistent with Study 1. In slight contrast to Study 1, however,
low-CRT people are also associated with strong altruistic
motivations. It is important to note that, in Study 2, we were
able to split the weak altruism/social-welfare preferences category
into four subcategories. In contrast to Study 1, we could therefore
isolate strong social-welfare concerns from weak social-welfare
concerns and conclude that it is the latter which best characterizes
individuals with high CRT scores. This methodological feature
of Study 2 may thus have facilitated the observation of a
difference in terms of CRT scores between those subjects
included in the default category and those classified as strongly
altruistic.

is close to significance with respect to “α ≥ 0.125, β ≥ 0”
(strongly spiteful, p = 0.08) and “α ≥ 0.125, β ǫ [0, 0.25]”
(strongly egalitarian, p = 0.08) and with respect to “α ≤ −0.25,
β ǫ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly altruistic with social-welfare concerns,
p = 0.13). The five remaining categories did not yield significant
CRT effects (ps > 0.23). An interesting difference of Study 2
with respect to Study 1 is that two of the “strong altruism”
categories show significant (or nearly significant) differences with
the default group. This did not happen in Study 1, where there
was only one such category (namely “α ≤ 0, β ≥ 0.5”) for
which the associated coefficient was largely insignificant. Note
that here the strongest difference is given by the comparison
with the following category “α ≥ 0.125, β ǫ [0.25, 0.5]”
(strongly egalitarian), which is the category higher CRT subjects
are less likely to belong to. However, the coefficient associated
to this category only differs significantly from the coefficient
of the following categories: “α ǫ [−0.25, 0], β ≤ 0” (weakly
inequality seeking; note that only two subjects belong to this
category), “α ǫ [0, 0.125], β ǫ [0, 0.25]” (weakly egalitarian),
and “α ǫ [0, 0.125], β ≥ 0.5” (strongly egalitarian; only three
subjects belong to this category) (ps < 0.05). The coefficient
associated to the “α ≥ 0.125, β ǫ [0.25, 0.5]” category also differs
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

less likely to be classified in the categories representing
strong social preferences. Accordingly, it may be tempting
to interpret our findings as evidence that cognitive reflection
goes along with self-interest in (non-strategic) one-shot social
interactions. This would be, however, an incorrect interpretation
of our findings because self-interest cannot explain why the
most reflective individuals are overwhelmingly characterized
as “mildly” altruistic while not being affected by other social
preferences like spitefulness or egalitarianism. Therefore, it is not
self-interest per se but a very particular mixture of self-interest
and altruistic/social-welfare concerns that characterizes reflective
individuals. In terms of the parameters of the generalized version
of the Fehr–Schmidt’s model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) used
here, high cognitive reflection is associated with a combination
of slightly negative values of envy (α) and slightly positive values
of compassion (β). Similar results have been obtained through
structural estimation of the individuals’ envy and compassion
parameters in Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara (2015). Moreover,
there are much less individual differences in these parameters
among individuals with high CRT scores than among individuals
with low CRT scores. While mean values of envy appear to
be higher for individuals with a less reflective cognitive style,
the relationship between CRT scores and compassion is more
complex. Indeed, either high or very low (even negative) values
of β can be associated with low cognitive reflection. Thus, we
would not have been able to uncover some of the key differences
between groups if we had focused on estimating mean values of
the model parameters.
From the viewpoint of the Social Heuristics Hypothesis
(Rand et al., 2014), our results suggest that behaviors driven
by either egalitarianism or spitefulness (and possibly strong
altruism) may be internalized as heuristics, which ultimately
implies that they may be, on average, advantageous in dailylife interactions. Indeed, neurobiological research indicates that
humans experience psychological satisfaction from observing
equitable outcomes (Tricomi et al., 2010; Zaki and Mitchell,
2011) but also from out-earning others (Fliessbach et al., 2007;
Bault et al., 2011), even if their own absolute payoff is unaffected.
On the other hand, reflection should lead people to adapt their
decision rules to the environment at hand (e.g., Kahneman,
2011). Under this logic, the present results indicate that the most
adaptive decisions in one-shot, non-strategic social interactions
are those guided by mildly altruistic motives.
These findings can shed light on the current debate regarding
whether (pro)social behavior is automatic or deliberate (Rand
and Nowak, 2013; Zaki and Mitchell, 2013). Previous research
has led to ostensibly contradictory results which have partly
been accounted for by the existence of moderator variables (e.g.,
subjects’ prior experience in economic experiments; Cone and
Rand, 2014; Rand et al., 2014, 2015) and confounding factors
(linked, for example, to the use of reaction times to infer the effect
of reflection on behavior; Recalde et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2015;
Krajbich et al., 2015). Yet, our findings reveal that another nonnegligible portion of these apparently conflicting findings can
be reconciled by accounting for two often-ignored factors. First,
different motives can lead to identical choices in the experimental
set-ups normally used to infer the nature of social behavior

Cognitive Reflection and Social
Preferences: Our Insights
In two studies, we showed that those individuals with a more
reflective cognitive style (i.e., those who are less likely to rely on
intuitive, System 1 processes) are more likely to make choices
consistent with mildly altruistic motives in simple monetary
decisions free of strategic and reciprocal concerns. These results
suggest that behaviors that increase social welfare by increasing
others’ payoffs at a very low or no cost for the individual may
be the result of conscious deliberation rather than automatic
heuristics. Behaviors driven by egalitarian or spiteful concerns,
however, appear to be more intimately associated with intuition6 .
While the above findings are robust across the two studies,
we also find a slight but remarkable difference with respect to
strongly altruistic choices that increase the other’s payoff at a
relatively high cost to the individual. In Study 1 reflective subjects
were quite likely to make such choices whereas in Study 2 they
were not. This may be partly explained by differences in stakes
across studies, although our estimation procedure relies on the
assumption that utility is linear over the relevant range of payoffs
(as in Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) in which case stakes would not
affect social preferences decisions. Methodological differences
across studies (in Study 2 weak altruism was divided into
four subcategories and strong altruism into two subcategories)
may also have facilitated the observation of this divergence.
In addition, this difference might also be accounted for by
either students’ educational backgrounds (majors) or cultural
differences (Study 1 was conducted in the US while Study
2 was conducted in Spain). Interestingly, no differences in
giving behavior between US and Spain student subjects were
documented in the baseline experiments conducted by Rey-Biel
et al. (2015) suggesting that cultural differences in giving may not
play a major role in our findings7 . Finally, this difference could
also be explained by the existence of ceiling effects as the average
level of cognitive reflection, as measured by the number of correct
answers to the CRT, was higher (25% higher, two-sided t-test:
p < 0.01) in Study 1. Exploring these possibilities is an interesting
avenue for future research.

Toward Reconciliation: A Unified View of
the Cognitive Basis of Social Behavior
At first sight, it might seem that more reflective individuals
are guided by “weaker” social motivations as they are typically
6 In

a related strand of research on the psychological underpinnings of social
behavior, Espín et al. (2012, 2015) have shown that those individuals who discount
the future more heavily display more spite-based but not egalitarian behavior in
economic games (namely in a dual-role ultimatum game and a social dilemma
game with punishment). Since we find that lower CRT scores are related to both
spitefulness and egalitarianism, our results thus support Espín et al.’s arguments
that the social behaviors associated with short-run (vs. long-run) goals differ from
those associated with intuitive (vs. controlled) processes (even though temporal
discounting is negatively correlated with CRT scores; see Frederick, 2005; BoschDomènech et al., 2014).
7 The authors found differences across samples only in the case in which
the determinants (work or luck) of participants’ income (the endowment of
participants in our case) were not known.
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step toward achieving a more complete understanding of the
cognitive basis of human social behavior (Nash et al., 2015).

(Charness and Rabin, 2002). Second, by putting the focus almost
exclusively on the conflict between prosociality and self-interest,
previous research has tended to overlook antisocial motivations
that can trigger behaviors which may appear as selfish or even
prosocial (e.g., Espín et al., 2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 2014).
In sum, our findings highlight that the analysis of the
cognitive basis of social behavior is likely to be more complex
than previously thought. It must also be said, however, that
strategic issues and reciprocity (which were voluntarily absent
of our study) may play an essential role in social dilemma and
ultimatum games (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), blurring further
the analysis of the cognitive basis of social behavior (Rand and
Nowak, 2013).
Finally, our results are based on a trait approach to cognitive
reflection, which by definition has to be addressed in a
correlational manner thus leaving open concerns about causality
and about the existence of third-variable confounds. It would
therefore be important for future research to assess the robustness
of these findings to experimental manipulations of intuitive
processing. Identifying the neurobiological underpinnings of
these individual differences in trait reflectiveness and their
relationship to social preferences appears as a necessary next
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